VulnerabilitiesJanuary 18, 20263 min read

CISA Releases 10 ICS Advisories for Siemens, Schneider, Others

Industrial control system vulnerabilities disclosed in Siemens RUGGEDCOM, Industrial Edge devices, Schneider EcoStruxure, AVEVA, and Festo products.

Marcus Chen

CISA published ten industrial control system advisories on January 14-15, covering vulnerabilities in products from Siemens, Schneider Electric, AVEVA, and Festo. The advisories affect equipment deployed across manufacturing, energy, and critical infrastructure sectors.

Organizations running industrial control systems should review the advisories for affected products and apply vendor mitigations. ICS vulnerabilities often require coordinated maintenance windows, making early assessment critical for remediation planning.

Advisory Summary

January 15, 2026:

  • ICSA-26-015-01: AVEVA Process Optimization

January 14, 2026:

  • ICSA-26-015-10: Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Power Build Rapsody
  • ICSA-26-015-09: Siemens Industrial Edge Device Kit
  • ICSA-26-015-08: Siemens Industrial Edge Devices
  • ICSA-26-015-07: Siemens RUGGEDCOM APE1808 Devices
  • ICSA-26-015-06: Siemens SINEC Security Monitor
  • ICSA-26-015-05: Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROS
  • ICSA-26-015-04: Siemens SIMATIC and SIPLUS products
  • ICSA-26-015-03: Siemens TeleControl Server Basic
  • ICSA-26-015-02: Festo Firmware

Siemens Dominates This Batch

Seven of the ten advisories address Siemens products, covering a range of industrial networking, edge computing, and process control equipment.

The RUGGEDCOM advisories warrant particular attention. RUGGEDCOM equipment typically deploys in harsh environments—substations, rail systems, industrial facilities—where replacement or patching requires physical access and careful scheduling. Security teams should verify whether affected versions exist in their environments early in the assessment process.

Industrial Edge devices represent Siemens' push toward edge computing in OT environments. Vulnerabilities in these products could provide attackers with footholds closer to production systems than traditional IT-based attacks would allow.

Schneider Electric and AVEVA

Schneider Electric's EcoStruxure Power Build Rapsody is software for designing electrical panels and power distribution systems. Vulnerabilities in design tools can have indirect security implications when compromised project files propagate through engineering workflows.

AVEVA Process Optimization affects process industries including chemicals, refining, and pharmaceuticals. Process optimization systems connect to operational data, making them attractive targets for attackers seeking to understand or manipulate industrial processes.

Festo Firmware

Festo manufactures automation components including pneumatic actuators, electric drives, and controllers. The firmware advisory affects devices used in manufacturing automation, where compromised controllers could disrupt production lines or create safety hazards.

Why ICS Advisories Matter

Industrial control system vulnerabilities differ from IT security issues in several ways:

Patching constraints: Production systems often can't be taken offline for updates without significant business impact. Maintenance windows are limited and carefully planned.

Extended lifecycles: Industrial equipment operates for decades. Systems deployed 15 years ago still run production processes, and vendors may have discontinued security support.

Safety implications: Compromised industrial systems can cause physical harm—explosions, chemical releases, equipment failures that endanger workers.

Air gap erosion: The traditional isolation between IT and OT networks has eroded as organizations pursue digitalization initiatives. Edge computing, remote monitoring, and cloud connectivity introduce new attack paths.

Recommended Actions

CISA recommends reviewing the individual advisories at cisa.gov/ics-advisories for specific vulnerability details, affected versions, and vendor mitigation guidance.

For organizations with Siemens, Schneider, AVEVA, or Festo equipment:

  1. Inventory affected systems to determine exposure scope
  2. Review network segmentation between IT and OT environments
  3. Plan maintenance windows for applying available patches
  4. Implement compensating controls where immediate patching isn't feasible
  5. Monitor for exploitation attempts using ICS-specific detection capabilities

The batch release pattern—multiple advisories covering multiple vendors simultaneously—reflects coordinated disclosure processes. Defenders should expect similar batches as the year progresses, maintaining awareness of ICS-specific threats alongside traditional IT security priorities.

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