Infostealers Now Targeting AI Agent Configurations

Infostealer malware has expanded its shopping list to include AI agent configurations. Hudson Rock researchers disclosed on February 13 that they detected a Vidar infostealer variant successfully exfiltrating an OpenClaw user's configuration files—including gateway tokens and cryptographic keys that define the AI assistant's identity.

The theft marks what researchers call "a significant milestone in the evolution of infostealer behavior: the transition from stealing browser credentials to harvesting the 'souls' and identities of personal AI agents."

What Was Stolen

The infostealer grabbed three files from the victim's OpenClaw workspace:

openclaw.json — Contains the OpenClaw gateway authentication token, the victim's email address, and workspace path configuration. This token enables remote connection to the victim's AI agent.

device.json — Holds cryptographic keys used for secure device pairing and request signing. These keys authenticate the client to OpenClaw's backend services.

soul.md — Defines the AI agent's personality, operational boundaries, and behavioral guidelines. Think of it as the system prompt that shapes how the agent responds.

Together, these files represent the complete identity of the user's AI assistant. An attacker with these files could impersonate the victim's AI agent, access whatever services it connects to, or—if the OpenClaw port is exposed—directly connect to the victim's local instance.

Not a Targeted Module, But a Lucky Grab

The Vidar variant didn't specifically target OpenClaw. Instead, it ran a broad file-grabbing routine designed to hoover up anything containing keywords like "token," "private key," or "secret." OpenClaw's configuration files happened to match those patterns.

This is worse news than a targeted attack would be. Targeted malware requires attackers to know their victims use specific software. Generic file scrapers catch everyone—the stealer will grab OpenClaw configs from any infected machine, regardless of whether the operator knew the victim was an AI assistant user.

The pattern mirrors how infostealers evolved to grab browser extension data and session tokens. What starts as incidental theft becomes a dedicated module once attackers realize the value.

The Growing AI Agent Attack Surface

This incident lands during a rough stretch for OpenClaw security. Just two weeks ago, we covered 341 malicious skills on ClawHub distributing Atomic Stealer through fake cryptocurrency tools. That campaign involved malicious extensions actively compromising users. This new threat is different—it's traditional malware stealing AI configurations as collateral data.

Hudson Rock's finding suggests the next evolution: infostealers developing dedicated modules to decrypt and parse AI agent files, just like they currently do for Chrome passwords and Telegram sessions.

The risk scales with AI agent adoption. SecurityScorecard researchers identified hundreds of thousands of exposed OpenClaw instances during their analysis. Many run with default configurations, exposing management ports to the internet. A stolen gateway token combined with an exposed port equals complete AI agent compromise.

What Attackers Can Do With AI Agent Credentials

Stolen OpenClaw configurations enable several attack paths:

Remote agent access — If the victim exposes their OpenClaw port (default 3000), attackers can connect directly using the stolen gateway token and execute commands through the AI agent.

Impersonation — The gateway token authenticates requests to OpenClaw's cloud services. Attackers can masquerade as the victim's client, potentially accessing integrated services or triggering actions the victim authorized.

Lateral movement — OpenClaw configurations may reference API keys, database credentials, or other secrets the agent uses. These become additional attack vectors.

Social engineering — The soul.md file reveals how the victim has customized their AI assistant. Attackers could craft phishing that mimics the agent's communication style.

Protecting AI Agent Environments

For OpenClaw users:

1. Never expose OpenClaw ports to the internet — The management interface should only be accessible from localhost or trusted networks
2. Rotate gateway tokens regularly — Treat them like API keys that could be compromised
3. Audit soul.md for sensitive information — Don't embed secrets or personal details in your agent's personality file
4. Monitor for unauthorized access — Check OpenClaw logs for connections from unfamiliar IP addresses
5. Use endpoint protection — Modern EDR can detect infostealer behavior before exfiltration completes

The broader lesson applies to any AI agent platform, not just OpenClaw. As AI assistants integrate deeper into professional workflows, their configuration files become valuable targets. The same security discipline applied to SSH keys and cloud credentials should extend to AI agent identities.

Why This Matters

"As AI agents like OpenClaw become more integrated into professional workflows, infostealer developers will likely release dedicated modules specifically designed to decrypt and parse these files," Hudson Rock researchers warned. The trajectory is clear: what's incidentally stolen today becomes intentionally targeted tomorrow.

Infostealers already capture billions of credentials annually. Adding AI agent configurations to that haul creates new categories of compromise. Organizations deploying AI assistants need to include those configurations in their credential hygiene programs—rotating tokens, monitoring access, and treating agent identities with the same care as user credentials.

The era of AI agent security is here, and attackers are adapting faster than defenders.